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Power is not a means, it’s an end.
—O’Brien (Nineteen Eighty-Four)
If you go into a typical grocery store in the United States and make your way 
back to the margarine case, you will probably see approximately a dozen 
different brands. If you look very closely at the packaging, however, you may find 
a small seal, which signifies the majority of these are owned by either Unilever 
or ConAgra (Table 1.1). Although these two firms dominate the margarine 
market—Unilever accounts for 51.2 percent of sales in the US market and 
ConAgra for 16.9 percent (Grocery Headquarters 2013)—their power is hidden 
from us through an illusion of numerous competing brands. Margarine is not a 
unique case, and while the number of options offered may differ, similar patterns 
can be found in almost every food or beverage category. The bread shelves, 
for example, may provide slightly more choices, but this conceals the fact that 
Grupo Bimbo and Flowers Foods each own more than a dozen leading brands 
and together control approximately half of the US market (Thomas and Cavale 
2013). The wine aisle may contain literally hundreds of brands, but it is very 
Food system concentration: a 
political economy perspective
Chapter 1
Table 1.1 Ownership of margarine brands
Unilever ConAgra
Becel Blue Bonnet
Brummel & Brown Fleischmann’s
I Can’t Believe It’s Not Butter Move Over Butter
Imperial Parkay
Promise
Shedd’s Spread Country Crock
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2 Concentration and Power in the Food System
difficult to discern that scores of these, as well as more than half of US sales, are 
controlled by only three companies: Gallo, The Wine Group, and Constellation 
(Howard et al. 2012). In nearly every other stage of the food system, including 
retailing, distribution, farming and farm inputs (e.g., seeds, fertilizers, pesticides), 
a limited number of firms or operations tend to make up the vast majority of 
sales.
Is this a problem? An increasing number of people argue that indeed it is: 
the firms that dominate these industries are criticized for a long list of purported 
negative impacts on society and the environment. Just a few examples include:
t 8BMNBSUXIJDIDPOUSPMTQFSDFOUPG64HSPDFSZSFUBJMJOHJTDIBMMFOHFEGPS
exploiting its suppliers, taking advantage of taxpayer subsidies, and paying 
extremely low worker wages.
t .D%POBMETXIJDIDPOUSPMTNPSFUIBOQFSDFOUPG64GBTUGPPETBMFTJT
also critiqued for extremely low wages, as well as the negative health conse-
quences and environmental impacts of its products.
t 5ZTPOXIJDIDPOUSPMTNPSFUIBOQFSDFOUPG64DIJDLFOQPSLBOECFFG
processing is reproached for its pollution, poor treatment of farmers, and 
contributions to the decline of rural communities.
t .POTBOUPXIJDIDPOUSPMTQFSDFOUPGUIFHMPCBMDPNNFSDJBMTFFENBSLFU
is denounced for its influence on government policies, spying on farmers it 
suspects of saving and replanting seeds, and the environmental impacts of 
herbicides tied to these seeds.
These impacts tend to disproportionately affect the disadvantaged—such as 
women, young children, recent immigrants, members of minority ethnic groups, 
and those of lower socioeconomic status—and as a result, reinforce existing 
inequalities (Allen and Wilson 2008). Like ownership relations, the full extent of 
these consequences may be hidden from public view.
This book seeks to illuminate which firms have become the most dominant, 
and more importantly, how they shape and reshape society in their efforts to 
increase their control. These dynamics have received insufficient attention from 
academics and even critics of the current food system. The power of dominant 
firms extends far beyond narrow economic boundaries, for example, providing 
them with the ability to damage numerous communities and ecosystems in 
their pursuit of higher than average profits. The social resistance provoked by 
these negative consequences is another area that is less visible to the majority 
of the population. When such resistance is evident at all, it frequently appears 
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insignificant, failing to challenge the direction of current trends. Even very small 
movements, however, may influence which firms end up winners or losers or 
close off particular avenues for growth. These accomplishments also suggest 
potential limits and therefore the possibility that dominant firms may experience 
much greater threats to their power in the future.
Increasing concentration
Concentration is a term used to describe the composition of a given market, 
and especially its potential impacts on competition. At one end of the 
spectrum are markets that are described as unconcentrated or fragmented, 
which economists consider to be freely competitive (Figure 1.1). In this type of 
market, sellers are “price takers” and lack the ability to raise prices. At the other 
end of the spectrum are concentrated markets, which in their most extreme 
form are monopolies controlled by just one firm. In these situations there are 
no alternatives, and the monopolists have substantial power to raise prices 
without losing customers. Also at this end of the spectrum are oligopolies, in 
which markets are dominated by several large firms but are characterized by 
very limited forms of competition; these are sometimes described by critics 
as “shared monopolies” (Bowles, Edwards, and Roosevelt 2005, 265). In the 
middle are partial oligopolies, in which large firms may have some control over 
Figure 1.1 Levels of market concentration.
Each rectangle represents a single, hypothetical firm, with size proportional to market share.
MonopolyOligopolyPartial OligopolyCompetitive
Unconcentrated Concentrated
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4 Concentration and Power in the Food System
their prices but lack the power to significantly reduce competition, as is the case 
with oligopolies. The word monopoly is derived from the Greek words for single 
(mono) and seller (polein), but concentrated markets may also occur among 
buyers, as found in a monopsony or oligopsony (derived from the Greek word 
for buy, opso¯nía).
There has been a strong tendency in more industrialized countries, including 
the United States, to move away from competitive markets and toward higher 
levels of concentration (Heffernan, Hendrickson, and Gronski 1999; Du Boff and 
Herman 2001). As markets go through this process of consolidation, the aver-
age firm size increases, barriers to entry for other firms rise, and the remaining 
firms have more influence over prices, as well as a greater potential for higher 
profits. These are some of the widely recognized reasons why markets tend 
to become less competitive—firms understand the benefits to be gained by 
expanding their market share, reducing the number of competing firms, and 
increasing their leverage over the terms of exchange (Foster and McChesney 
2012). These trends are most evident in industries such as airlines and tele-
communications, in which the US government intervened to encourage greater 
competition, only for them to eventually return to more oligopolistic structures 
(Brock 2011).
Potential negative impacts
Governments sometimes intervene when industries reach a high level of 
concentration because such limited competition may lead to numerous negative 
outcomes. Market consequences could include consumers paying higher 
prices, suppliers receiving lower prices, or reduced innovation. Oligopolistic firms 
have disincentives to reduce profits by investing in research and development, 
particularly when doing so could lead to lower barriers to entry and increasing 
competition. In addition, large organizational size can discourage innovation 
indirectly, via complex bureaucracies that are reluctant to approve new ideas 
(Brock 2011). Increasing size can be an advantage for reducing prices paid for 
inputs, however, as smaller suppliers may have fewer alternative buyers for their 
products and less organizational capacity to negotiate the best possible terms 
(Calvin et al. 2001).
In order to raise consumer prices, it is not necessary for executives to gather 
in one room and conspire to achieve these markups. When just a few firms 
control a large share of the market, they can simply indicate their intention to 
raise prices, and the others will benefit by following suit, a strategy that is called 
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price signaling (Baran and Sweezy 1966). Oligopolistic firms can more easily 
pressure each other to avoid price wars that would lower their profits. The result 
is an unwritten rule that rivalries based on advertising, product differentiation, 
and reducing labor costs are expected, but competing on price is unacceptable. 
John Bell, a former CEO of a coffee company that was eventually acquired by 
Kraft, explained that he was constantly reinforcing this message to rivals through 
his speeches and media interviews in order to prevent “the natural competitive 
reaction.” Lowering prices was given the code word “non-strategic” in public 
communications, and emphasizing his opposition to it was “an indirect means 
of telling competition to ‘play ball’ (Bell 2012).”
Nevertheless, executives in industries controlled by a small number of firms 
may go beyond signaling and are occasionally even caught conspiring to fix 
prices. A few examples include:
t 5IF64'FEFSBM5SBEF$PNNJTTJPO	'5$
EJTDPWFSFEJOUIFNJETUIBU
leading bakeries and retailers in Washington State had met frequently and 
agreed to increase the price of bread by 15–20 percent (Parker 1976).
t *O)FSTIFZQMFBEFEHVJMUZUPXPSLJOHXJUIPUIFSMBSHFDIPDPMBUFNBOV-
facturers (Mars, Nestlé, and Cadbury) to raise prices in Canada. While the 
other firms denied the charges, together they paid more than $22 million to 
settle a resulting class-action lawsuit (Culliney 2013).
t 8FTUFSO&VSPQFBOHPWFSONFOUTIBWFSFQPSUFEOVNFSPVTTDIFNFTUPSBJTF
food prices in recent years (e.g., beer, flour, bananas, chocolate and dairy 
products), which have resulted in fines totaling hundreds of millions of dollars.
As mentioned above, additional problems may result from increasing 
concentration in the food industry, including negative impacts on communities, 
labor, human health, animal welfare and the environment (economists define 
many of these impacts as “externalities”).
Regardless of the consequences, as industries consolidate, fewer and 
fewer people have the power to make important decisions, such as what 
is produced, how it is produced, and who has access to these products 
(Heffernan, Hendrickson, and Gronski 1999). Dominant firms are typically 
controlled by a small board of directors (eleven people on average), with deci-
sion-making power concentrated in the hands of the chief executive officer 
(CEO). The individuals who serve on these boards typically do not reflect 
the composition of society and in the United States are most often men, of 
European ethnicity, with an average age of 60 and educated at elite institutions 
9781472581112_txt_rev.indd   5 8/8/15   5:16 PM
6 Concentration and Power in the Food System
like Ivy League schools (Lyson and Raymer 2000). They also tend to share 
very similar conservative worldviews through frequent socializing with other 
members of the upper class in exclusive clubs, summer resorts, philanthropic 
organizations, etc. (Domhoff 2014).
Unanswered questions
Despite its adverse impacts on society at large, increasing market concentration 
is frequently portrayed as unstoppable. Business historian Louis Galambos, 
for example, claims that, “Global oligopolies are as inevitable as the sunrise” 
(Zachary 1999). Scientists who study social networks, including business 
networks, have pointed to a tendency for the “rich to get richer” as their initial 
advantages are magnified and eventually snowball, leading to even greater 
success (Barabási and Bonabeau 2003; Easley and Kleinberg 2010). Yet these 
trends have been highly uneven temporally, geographically, and by position 
within the food system (Friedland 2004). The farming of commodity crops in the 
Midwestern United States or the regional distribution of many specialized foods, 
for example, can still be characterized as competitive markets, suggesting that 
establishing and maintaining an oligopoly is not always as easy as claimed 
(Lewontin and Berlan 1986; Lewontin 2000).
The interesting question, then, is why have some segments of the food 
system already become oligopolies and not others? Why don’t they all resemble 
the global soft drink industry, which has been dominated by just two firms, Coca-
Cola and Pepsi, for decades? This suggests additional questions, such as what 
specific factors currently constrain other food and agriculture industries from 
approaching this organizational model? What factors might enable them? The 
answers are important because they might help slow, or even reverse, current 
trends toward concentration. Even if they don’t take us quite that far, a better 
understanding of how concentration occurs could help us to shape its direction 
and ameliorate some of its negative impacts.
Before answering these questions, however, a critical first step is simply to 
characterize the changes that have taken place, which can be more difficult 
than it sounds. Determining the level of concentration in different food indus-
tries is complicated by the inaccessibility of accurate sales data (Heffernan, 
Hendrickson, and Gronski 1999; Fernandez-Cornejo and Just 2007), even for 
“publicly” held firms. Uncovering just who owns what is also challenged by 
the opaque and constantly shifting corporate parentage of many brands and 
subsidiaries. Due to increasing public concern about food issues—evidenced 
by bestselling books by Eric Schlosser, Michael Pollan, and Barbara Kingsolver, 
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and numerous documentary films that critique the current food system—some 
firms are taking increasing measures to hide their dominance. Trade journals 
are less likely to report market shares for leading food and agricultural firms, for 
example, and the types of acquisitions that typically generated press releases in 
the late 1990s may now go unannounced.
Differing perspectives
Economics
Industry concentration is studied primarily by economists. One simple 
indicator that they developed to characterize the competitiveness of markets 
is a concentration ratio or the sum of the market shares of the top firms. A 
frequently used number is the top four, sometimes abbreviated as a CR4. 
Thresholds vary depending on the analyst, but most institutional economists 
suggest that when four firms control more than 40 percent or 50 percent of 
a market, it is no longer competitive (Scherer and Ross 1990; Shepherd and 
Shepherd 2004). A more recent measure, used by regulators such as the US 
Department of Justice (DOJ) to evaluate mergers and acquisitions, is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The index is the sum of squares of market 
share for all the firms in a given market. If one firm, for example, controlled 
100 percent of a market, the HHI would be 100 squared, or 10,000. If two 
firms divided the market, the HHI would be 5,000 (50 squared + 50 squared). 
The US government once considered markets with an HHI above 1,800 to be 
highly concentrated (Gould 2010). Notably, this level would not be exceeded if 
four equally sized firms controlled 80 percent of the market, despite the highly 
conducive environment for price signaling that would result. In 2010, the DOJ 
and the FTC raised the threshold even higher, to 2,500—the equivalent of four 
firms evenly dividing 100 percent of the market. Although the HHI is designed 
to be more sensitive to changes in market share among the top firms, it is less 
intuitive than concentration ratios.
A weakness of both measures is that they are designed to character-
ize horizontal integration within a national (or smaller than national) market. 
Concentration is increasingly occurring through vertical integration, however, as 
firms buy upstream suppliers or downstream retailers, both in national markets 
and at the global level. In addition to direct ownership, less formal but still 
effective means of control are becoming more common, such as strategic alli-
ances or contracting arrangements (Heffernan 2000). As a result, the full extent 
of market power has become much more difficult to establish accurately, and 
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concentration measures may underestimate the ability of firms to enhance their 
own interests at the expense of others.
Mainstream economists tend to view concentration as unproblematic, due 
to a strong abstract belief in economies of scale, despite insufficient empirical 
evidence to support these supposed efficiencies (Johnson and Ruttan 1994; 
DiLorenzo 1996). Consumers are often claimed to benefit from synergies and 
lower transaction costs that are expected to result from mergers and acqui-
sitions (Farrell and Shapiro 2001). Because of their organizational complexity, 
however, many large firms actually encounter diseconomies of scale and expe-
rience a loss of efficiency with increasing size (Adams and Brock 2004; Carson 
2008). This may explain why acquisitions often fall short of expectations, and an 
estimated one out of three are eventually undone, via sales to competitors or 
spin-offs into new firms (Buono and Bowditch 1989).
Most economists also tend to focus on narrow criteria of economic power 
such as pricing or output measures and ignore other sources of power that can 
be utilized by large organizations. Walter Adams and James W. Brock (2004, 8), 
two economists who were critical of this tendency within their discipline, noted 
that additional powers include:
the capacity to obstruct technological advance; to manipulate the alternatives 
from which society is allowed to choose; to coerce society to accede to its 
demands through threats to shut down facilities or to relocate them elsewhere; 
to infiltrate government agencies with influential decision makers drawn from 
the industries ostensibly being regulated; and to obtain government bailouts 
when collapsing giants are considered to be too big and too important to be 
allowed to fail.
Political economy
Political economy takes a broader view than economics, recognizing a much 
higher degree of interaction between governmental agencies and private 
economic organizations. This field draws on additional disciplines including 
sociology, political science, geography, and cultural studies. Although it 
is very diverse, many of its strands are more critical of the status quo than 
orthodox economics. Political economists are therefore likely to question 
why markets are organized in their current form, who played a role in this, 
and how their structure benefits some more than others (Lipschutz 2010). 
One consequence is a much greater emphasis on power, although this is 
a difficult concept to define precisely. A broad definition, slightly modified 
from one proposed by Bertrand Russell in 1938, is “the capacity of some 
9781472581112_txt_rev.indd   8 8/8/15   5:16 PM
Food system concentration 9
persons to produce intended and foreseen effects on others” (Wrong 1995, 
2). Importantly, this capacity can be “naturalized” by institutions, so that the 
majority of people take it for granted and do not question it (Gramsci 1971; 
Gibson-Graham 2006).
A strand of political economy that focuses heavily on concentration is Paul 
Baran and Paul Sweezy’s (1966) theory of monopoly capital, which chal-
lenges conventional economists’ abstract emphasis on so-called perfect or 
free competition and their lack of attention to the rising number of oligopolies 
(Box 1). This theory has been expanded by colleagues to explore capitalists’ 
impacts on labor (Braverman 1998) and their growing emphasis on speculative 
finance (Magdoff and Sweezy 1987; Foster and McChesney 2012). Although 
strongly influenced by Karl Marx, their work has interesting parallels with 
libertarian political economists, who emphasize the essential role of govern-
ment regulations and subsidies in facilitating concentration (Stromberg 2001; 
Carson 2007).
A political economy approach that is frequently employed in food studies is 
value chain analysis or closely related approaches such as commodity systems 
analysis (Friedland 1984; Friedland 2004). These typically follow a single prod-
uct, from its design and production to its consumption, to understand how the 
entire system works. Value chain analysis has become much more global, as 
more food and agricultural firms have expanded around the world in search of 
new markets and lower material and labor costs (Dixon 2002; Pritchard and 
Burch 2003). Although the general approach is also applied in economics and 
business, critical political economists place more emphasis on analyzing differ-
ences in power in the relationships between firms and individuals throughout 
the chain. Most commodity systems and value chain analyses of foods have 
heavily emphasized the production stages and particularly the role of labor. 
There is an increasing recognition of the need to place more emphasis on 
consumption, however (Lockie and Kitto 2000; Goodman 2002; Goodman and 
DuPuis 2002).
Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation (1944) has also been influential 
among those who study food. Polanyi suggests that there is a “double move-
ment” that results when the negative impacts of capitalist expansion incite a 
spontaneous, defensive reaction. This helps to explain a number of movements 
against the dominant food and agricultural system, from US farmer protests 
against railroads in the late 1800s (Constance, Hendrickson, and Howard 2014) 
to global certification of fair trade labels beginning in the late 1980s (Jaffee 
2007). The theory can be criticized for being “underspecified” and failing to 
predict exactly what would trigger such a response, however (Munck 2006, 185). 
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“Counter-movements” have certainly not proven to be automatic, especially if 
the impacts of capitalists’ actions are hidden or legitimized or if government 
repression is successful.
Box 1.1 The Missouri School of Agriculture and Food Studies
Although all of my grandparents were raised on farms and grew much of 
their own food, my childhood was spent in the suburbs. Virtually all of my 
food came from the supermarket, and I knew very little about the system 
that produced it. In the late 1990s, when I became a graduate student at the 
University of Missouri, I was quite surprised to learn of the increasing levels 
of concentration in US food industries, and how powerful a small number of 
firms had become.
This was a major focus of what has become known as the “Missouri 
School” of agricultural and food studies (although it has had far less influ-
ence than the Chicago School of economics that originated at the University 
of Chicago in the 1940s). The group developed as a result of the efforts of 
William D. Heffernan, along with students and colleagues at the University 
of Missouri’s Department of Rural Sociology (Kleiner and Green 2009). 
Heffernan studied the dynamics of the poultry industry beginning in the 
1960s, focusing on the increasing use of contracts between processors and 
producers. He found that this had some initial advantages for poultry grow-
ers, but power shifted dramatically toward processors over time (Heffernan 
1972; Hendrickson et al. 2008a). Later, he and his co-authors examined 
concentration and its impacts on local communities for other Midwestern 
commodities, such as beef, pork, corn, and soybeans (Heffernan, 
Hendrickson, and Gronski 1999). My first collaboration with these research-
ers involved a study of structural changes in the retail and dairy industries 
(Hendrickson et al. 2001).
The approach of the Missouri School is pragmatic, with an emphasis on 
characterizing problems in the food system and assisting affected commu-
nities to address them (Constance et al. 2014). Rather than adhering to one 
specific theory, its practitioners draw on multiple perspectives, including 
those of Max Weber, Karl Marx, and Thorstein Veblen, as well as more recent 
approaches, such as those of monopoly capital theorists associated with 
the Monthly Review (Baran and Sweezy 1966; Foster and McChesney 2012). 
Bonanno (2009) notes that the Missouri School is most closely aligned with the 
philosophy of John Dewey, which is fundamentally anti-elitist. This means that 
we would oppose concentration even if it did not lead to any negative impacts 
on society or the environment, as it gives a small minority great power over the 
food we eat.
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Capital as power
In this book, I employ a political economy approach but draw more specifically 
on Jonathan Nitzan and Shimson Bichler’s theory of Capital as Power (2009). 
This theory seeks to understand capital from the point of view of capitalists, 
especially those who benefit the most from the current system: the largest 
corporations and the wealthiest individuals, who are typically major shareholders 
in these firms. Capital as Power recognizes that corporations quantify their 
perceived influence through “capitalization.” Technically this is calculated as 
the firm’s current share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding, 
but it can be viewed as an estimate of the future stream of earnings in present 
values while adjusting for perceived risks. Another way of thinking about 
capitalization is that it is a quantification of capitalists’ consensus expectations 
that people will continue to acquiesce to the firm’s power. It therefore measures 
not just a firm’s capacity to provide goods and services but “the power of its 
owners and directors to shape and reshape politics, society and culture” (Di 
Muzio 2013, 6).
Echoing O’Brien in the dystopian film, Nineteen Eighty-Four, they note that 
power is not only a means of accumulation but “also the ultimate end of accu-
mulation” (Nitzan and Bichler 2009, 16). Capitalism as a system is therefore 
better understood as a mode of power rather than a mode of production. This 
shift, in comparison to other theories, places even more emphasis on social 
relations than on material objects (e.g., embodied labor or utility). It also seeks 
to understand both quantitative changes in markets and qualitative changes 
in society as part of the same process of the accumulation of power (Baines 
2015).
An important aspect of this perspective is the view that dominant firms do not 
try to maximize profits, as is typically argued by other political economy perspec-
tives (see Magdoff and Foster 2011). Instead, firms compare their performance 
to close competitors and use benchmarks, such as the S&P 500 share price 
index, to monitor the average capitalization for the largest firms. Differential 
accumulation may not sound substantially different than profit maximization, but 
it is a far more realistic description of corporate behavior and with some very 
important implications. In periods of stagnation, for example, growth rates may 
slow, but dominant capitalists are content to grow faster than the average or 
even to decline less than the average, as this means their capitalization and 
power are still increasing in relative terms. Conditions of high economic growth 
are actually riskier, because capitalists are more likely to lose power relative 
to others (Nitzan and Bichler 2014). Additional empirical support for this view 
comes from Thomas Piketty’s (2014) analysis of several centuries of income and 
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wealth data in developed countries, which found increasing inequality during 
periods of low growth rates (Piketty 2014).
Conflict drives this competition, which means that capitalists have little choice 
but to try to increase their income and assets relative to those of others, or 
risk going out of business, sometimes via acquisition by a competitor (Bichler 
and Nitzan 2014). This requires active efforts to restructure markets and society 
in ways that increase their power, including encouraging increased consump-
tion of their products and sabotaging potential alternatives, particularly those 
that would allow people to be more self-reliant. All of these actions focus on 
increasing profits but in comparison to other firms, not to achieve a theoretical 
maximum. An intended increase in inequality is one result, as well as numerous 
additional negative impacts, which, from the perspective of capitalists, could be 
viewed as collateral damage (Cochrane 2010).
The Capital as Power approach challenges some widely held categoriza-
tions. Many political economists, such as the monopoly capital group, view 
finance as “fictitious” or separate from material capital, such as physical plants 
and equipment (Hager 2013, 43). Nitzan & Bichler, in contrast, state that when 
the object of accumulation is viewed as power, “all capital is finance, and only 
finance (2009, 262).” They also claim there is no distinction between dominant 
capital and governments, suggesting that their interests overlap to such a great 
extent and the power of capitalists is so dependent on government actions that 
boundaries are meaningless (Nitzan and Bichler 2009). Sympathetic critics have 
pointed out, however, that governments are subject to other logics, in addition 
to accumulation (Starrs 2013). James O’Connor (1973), for instance, described 
the tension between accumulation and legitimation or the need for policies to 
be seen as justified by the majority of the population. A government’s legiti-
macy can be undermined if the public recognizes harms resulting from policies 
that aid dominant capitalists’ strategies of accumulation. Therefore, when resist-
ance threatens to undermine the stability of the system, governments take at 
least symbolic actions to maintain an appearance of civic interest (Green and 
Heffernan 1984).
Concentration is a key strategy to increase power, one that Nitzan and Bichler 
(2009) call breadth. This path involves either internal growth (also called green-
field or organic growth) that is faster than competitors or external growth via 
mergers and acquisitions. External growth is often preferred because it is a less 
risky means of increasing size and power. Even if such combinations fail to 
increase, or even reduce, productive capacity or potential, they frequently result 
in a higher total capitalization—reflecting an expected increase in power (Nitzan 
1998). Acquisitions are far more common than mergers, as firms that are already 
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dominant are more likely to have internally-generated resources or can borrow to 
finance buyouts of other firms.
The other key strategy is described as depth, which involves cost cutting 
or price increases (Nitzan and Bichler 2009). As discussed above, firms that 
are more successful with breadth, and therefore achieve greater market share, 
also gain significantly more power to enact price increases. Nitzan and Bichler 
suggest that cost-cutting strategies are more easily replicated by rival firms, and 
thus less effective for outperforming benchmarks, but this does not give enough 
attention to the possibility that the largest firms have more power to (1) demand 
lower prices from suppliers, (2) negotiate lower wages for workers, or (3) obtain 
government subsidies.
Power in the food system
Because we depend on food to live, concentration raises more concern in food 
industries than in most other economic sectors. The importance of food also 
makes it a key site of contestation in economic, political, and cultural realms. 
Virtually all governments have thus adopted special agricultural policies—for 
example, to ensure that food is produced in sufficient quantity and available at 
affordable prices while keeping farmers economically viable (Hendrickson et al. 
2008b).
Which firms are the most dominant in the global food system? Table 1.2 lists 
those engaged in food and agriculture that are among the top 500 firms in the 
world according to market capitalization. Most of these focus on packaged foods 
(eighteen firms, $1.46 trillion), followed by retail (eleven firms, $685 billion) and 
agricultural inputs (nine firms, $557 billion). Commodity firms and distributors 
are represented by just one firm in each case, near the bottom of the list, while 
farming is a segment of the food system that does not have any firms of this 
magnitude. The result is an hourglass-shaped system, with a large number of 
farmers at the top, an even larger number of people who eat food at the bottom, 
but a much smaller number of firms in the middle that control how food is moved 
from producers to consumers (Heffernan, Hendrickson, and Gronski 1999).
Adopting a broad understanding of power, the following chapters explore 
how it is exercised in each major stage of the food system, as well as the 
organic food system—organic originated as an alternative to the mainstream 
but is an increasingly consolidating industry. With this value chain approach, I 
also focus on a more limited number of commodities/foods, such as soybeans, 
pork, milk, and leafy greens across some of these stages. The emphasis is on 
the United States, as nearly half of the firms in Table 1.2 are headquartered in 
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Table 1.2 Global market capitalization of dominant food firms, 2014
Firm (headquarters if not the 
United States)
Market 
capitalization in 
billions ($) Primary stage of food system
Walmart 247 Retail
Nestlé (Switzerland) 243 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Coca-Cola 170 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Anheuser-Busch InBev  
(Belgium)
169 Packaged Foods & Beverages
PepsiCo 128 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Unilever (Netherlands) 119 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Ambev (Brazil—subsidiary of  
AB InBev)
118 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Bayer (Germany) 112 Agricultural Inputs
BASF (Germany) 102 Agricultural Inputs
McDonald’s 97 Retail
SABMiller (UK) 80 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Diageo (UK) 78 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Caterpillar 63 Agricultural Inputs
DuPont 61 Agricultural Inputs
Monsanto 60 Agricultural Inputs
Dow 59 Agricultural Inputs
Mondelez 59 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Starbucks 55 Retail
Costco 49 Retail
Danone (France) 45 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Woolworths (Australia) 42 Retail
Heineken (Netherlands) 40 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Tesco (UK) 40 Retail
Target 38 Retail
Associated British Foods (UK) 37 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Syngenta (Switzerland) 35 Agricultural Inputs
(continued)
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Firm (headquarters if not the 
United States)
Market 
capitalization in 
billions ($) Primary stage of food system
Seven & I (Japan) 34 Retail
Deere 34 Agricultural Inputs
Kraft 33 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Yum! Brands 33 Retail
General Mills 32 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Femsa (Mexico) 32 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Pernod-Ricard (France) 31 Packaged Foods & Beverages
PotashCorp (Canada) 31 Agricultural Inputs
Archer Daniels Midland 28 Commodities
Carrefour (France) 28 Retail
Kweichow Moutai (China) 26 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Kellogg 23 Packaged Foods & Beverages
Kroger 22 Retail
Sysco* 21 Distribution
Source: Financial Times 2014. Note that many firms include sales of products or services 
unrelated to food and agriculture or extend into multiple stages of the food system through 
vertical integration. *Sysco was in the top 500 globally in 2013 but fell just below this threshold 
in 2014.
this country. In addition, market shares and concentration ratios, which provide 
quantitative indicators of their power, are more easily available at a national 
level. Comparisons are frequently made with other regions, however, particu-
larly when these dominant firms extend their influence to other parts of the world.
Each chapter also focuses on a key qualitative strategy that these firms use 
to restructure society, overcome restraints on concentration, and increase their 
control. Although they make use of numerous strategies, an in-depth examina-
tion of specific techniques, and the resistance they often provoke, challenges 
the notion that current levels of concentration were inevitable. Instead, it details 
the enormous efforts that firms must expend in order to continually increase their 
power, using strategies that include:
t DIBOHJOHUIFJOUFSQSFUBUJPOPGBOUJUSVTUMBXT	$IBQUFS

t TUSVDUVSJOHFYDIBOHFOFUXPSLT	$IBQUFS
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t SFTIBQJOHDPOTVNQUJPOIBCJUT	$IBQUFS

t NBOJQVMBUJOHQSJDFT	$IBQUFS

t NBJOUBJOJOHHPWFSONFOUTVCTJEJFT	$IBQUFS

t TUSFOHUIFOJOHJOUFMMFDUVBMQSPQFSUZQSPUFDUJPOT	$IBQUFS

t JOnVFODJOHWPMVOUBSZTUBOEBSET	$IBQUFS

In addition to the approaches noted above, a number of additional strategies 
are also briefly explored in boxes in subsequent chapters. Most of these boxes 
focus on the actions of second-ranked firms in food and agricultural industries, 
which typically receive less attention from researchers than the top firms, such 
as Walmart, AB InBev, and Archer Daniels Midland. Although the leading firms 
are likely to have the most disproportionate influence on society, a lower-ranked 
firm’s choice of strategies may succeed in achieving a shift in power, quantified 
by overtaking the top position.
The pattern that emerges is that capitalists increase their influence on soci-
ety by being extremely flexible. Because their initiatives are rarely unopposed, 
achieving firm and industry goals requires close cooperation with allied organ-
izations and reacting quickly to potential threats to their success, even when 
they appear insignificant. They are often able to circumvent challenges, adapt 
to demands for change, and co-opt potential forms of resistance. Their power 
is frequently hidden by being exercised indirectly, such as through their influ-
ence on government regulations and enforcement, on upstream or downstream 
firms, and key organizations (e.g., the mass media, foundations, think tanks, 
and universities). An examination of these dynamics, however, indicates that 
capitalists can sometimes be pressured into ameliorating some of their negative 
impacts, especially when the cost of not doing so would threaten the founda-
tions of the system that gives them so much control.
The next chapter describes how capitalists responded to one such challenge 
in the last century. At that time, the enactment of antitrust regulations helped 
restore public confidence in a political economic system that was becom-
ing dominated by a small number of firms. These regulations are now being 
reshaped to reduce these limits to their power. Retailing is one stage of the 
food system that, as a result, has become much more concentrated in recent 
decades.
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